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TORTIFICATION OF CONTRACT LAW:
DISPLACING CONSENT AND AGREEMENT
Walter Olsen t
One of the consequences of recent world events is the impend-
ing demise ofjokes about communism. For the record, I would like
to preserve the one about the veteran party leader who is harangu-
ing the troops-this is before they have taken over-and tells them:
"After the revolution, comrades, everyone will dine on strawberries
and cream." A hand goes up at the back of the room. It is a new
recruit. "But comrade," he says, "I don't like strawberries and
cream."
The leader explains that strawberries and cream is a wholesome
and natural dish, universally recognized as a tasty treat, even written
up in poetry. He argues very systematically, but the man at the back
is unconvinced. "Well, I don't know why," he says, "but Ijust don't
care for them." At which point the leader loses patience: "Rest as-
sured, comrade, that after the revolution you will like strawberries
and cream."
That is what is called paternalism. It is not confined to any one
movement or part of the political spectrum. It tends to crop up
wherever utopian ideas are found, and is even found in something
as far from communism as the American court system.
The paternalist project for our civil courts runs something as
follows. After the revolution-which perhaps has already taken
place-the average citizen will enjoy a vast array of wonderful new
rights to sue other people. You will be empowered to haul your
neighbors and fellow citizens to court if you feel they have fallen
short of good faith and fair play. You will be entitled to sue them
for unlimited damages, punitive as well as compensatory, even over
behavior that had previously been thought not subject to liability at
all. Everyone will be under a vague but stringent obligation to look
out for your safety and welfare, enforceable by legal action. You will
enjoy a cornucopia of contention opportunities, a smorgasbord of
suing options, a Lotus-land of litigability.
At this point you may raise your hand, like the recruit, to say
that you are not sure you want all these new benefits. You may not
t Walter Olsen is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. He is the author of
THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT
(1991) and editor of NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW (1988).
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want to keep others terrified about how and when they can be sued
for dealing with you. You may disagree with the courts' current def-
inition of what is negligent or defective or unreasonable in others'
behavior. You may, in short, be inclined to stamp your new legal
entitlements "return to sender." But you are out of luck. You will
find that many of your rights to sue, like the strawberries and cream,
cannot be waived. The rights are grounded not in traditional con-
tract law but in the principles of tort law. They are undisclaimable.
We know the basic differences. Tort law is modeled on the one-
sided, gratuitous infliction, as when a stranger drives into your front
porch and demolishes it. Nothing is pre-arranged or arrangeable;
nothing is of mutual benefit. In a contract situation, your front
porch is still ruined, but it is because an incompetent renovator has
gotten his hands on it. Tort law is seen as externally imposed; it
may reflect what some call natural law, or society's arbitrary decision
of who should be responsible for what, but in any case it reflects
something other than the choice of the parties. Contract obligations
are seen as a product of agreement. Tort law may in some sense
reduce itself to: "because we say so"-we being society as a whole
or judges or juries. Contract law is supposed to be: "because you
said so."
Other distinctions are familiar as well. In tort cases one can
typically ask for punitive damages and damages for such hard-to-
measure things as pain and suffering, humiliation, and emotional
distress. In contract law, the assumption is that absent some signal
to the contrary, the parties will not make such demands on each
other. The idea is that both sides have tacitly agreed to disarm
themselves of the most intimidating legal weaponry as a condition
of doing business, even as gunslingers are supposed to check their
weapons on entering the saloon.'
That was then. More recently, in what has been called the tor-
tification of contract law, courts have begun to treat more and more
consensual interactions as if they were, in part or whole, gratuitous
inflictions of harm. The machinery and weaponry of tort law, in-
cluding notions of punishment and open-ended damage calcula-
tions, are displacing the notion of consent and agreement.
Consider what happened after first baseman Leon Durham hit a
foul ball into the stands at a Chicago Cubs baseball game. The ball
struck Delbert Yates, Jr., who sued. The admission ticket to the ball
1 The ban on penalty clauses in contracts, which forces contracting parties to re-
sort to bonding and other stratagems when they want to arrange matters so as to penal-
ize one party for noncompliance, can be seen as an even clearer statement of the law's
assumption that, absent strong evidence to the contrary, people will deal with each other
only on an understanding not to sue for each other's punishment.
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park specifically disclaimed liability for any such event. Addition-
ally, the tradition in baseball is against plaintiff recovery for foul
balls, with or without disclaimer.2 Still, a Cook County circuit court
allowed recovery.3 The ticket made no difference, and apparently
would have made none even if Yates had signed it and had it
notarized.
In the mortgage world, lenders in Oklahoma and other states
are currently faced with a remarkable new judicial innovation inele-
gantly called the "cramdown." The situation arises when a bor-
rower is bankrupt but is trying to stave off foreclosure. The value of
the house has fallen sharply since it was financed. The borrower
asks that part of the mortgage simply be amputated to reflect the
decline in the value of the house, whereupon the borrower will re-
sume payments on the smaller amount. The court agrees, some-
times, and orders this.4 As a borrower's attorney put it, "If the
lender makes a stupid loan, why shouldn't he pay for it?" To which
the old reply would have been: "Because your client promised he
would not."
Similar trends are seen in employment law, in landlord-tenant
law, in insurance law, and so forth. More obligations have been
made undisclaimable, more exculpatory clauses have been struck
down as unconscionable, more duties have been grounded in public
policy rather than the evident agreement of the parties.
One of my least favorite cases along these lines comes from the
investment world. Discount stock brokers, who do not maintain re-
search staffs or commissioned salespeople, have been thriving in re-
cent years. To many of us, their most attractive feature is not their
low rates (though that is nice too) but that they never call. If you
have an account with Charles Schwab, you may sit down to dinner
without expecting the phone to ring with an urgent admonition to
sell everything they advised you to buy last week and buy everything
they told you to sell, for your own good of course. If you want,
Schwab will give you direct access to the market over your modem
or touch-tone phone, with no human intermediary at all, like a vend-
ing machine for stock purchases.5
2 See Davidoff v. Metropolitan Baseball Club, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 1219 (N.Y. 1984);
Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 424 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1981); Hunt v. Portland Base-
ball Club, 296 P.2d 495 (Ore. 1956); Leek v. Tacoma Baseball Club, 229 P.2d 329
(Wash. 1951). See also Walter T. Champion, Jr., "At the Ol'Ball Game" and Beyond: Specta-
tors and the Potential for Liability, 14 AM.J. TRIAL. ADvoc. 495 (1991).
3 See Stacy Adler, Chicago Jury Takes Swing at Cubs, Bus. INs., Dec. 4, 1989, at 3.
4 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); Todd Mason, Lenders Cringe As
Judges Chop Mortgage Value, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1990, at B1.
5 Jason Zweig, A Touch of Class, FORBES, Feb. 3, 1992, at 82-84 (20 percent of
Schwab's trades come in by way of touch-tone systems, 6 percent by modem).
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Unfortunately, some creative lawyers have launched an effort to
redefine this blessed neglect as negligence. One of them, represent-
ing a client who had made very bad investments, successfully filed a
claim against Schwab for, as he colorfully put it, letting his client
commit financial suicide. It was ruled that Schwab had an affirma-
tive duty to look after his client's interests and should pay for
breaching that duty.6
If the ruling stands, it is not hard to predict what will happen.
Discount brokers will have to monitor their clients' holdings much
more carefully and take affirmative steps to get in touch with clients
when they see dangerous patterns. Commission rates will go up,
and customers will be back to square one, wondering how to sepa-
rate the sincere advice from the self-interested churning. In effect,
consumers will have lost access to a valuable do-it-yourself option.
My point is that it is frequently quite rational to deal with peo-
ple who are not being especially careful on our behalf, who we ex-
pect to be only human, negligent or worse, who might turn out to
injure us or stand by while we injure ourselves. We choose to get
into the car with a family member at the wheel whom we consider an
incompetent driver. We go on doing business with the friendly dry
cleaner who breaks our shirt buttons. We let our neighbors take the
short cut across our property although they tread carelessly. We
return and buy more items from the sharpster antique dealer be-
cause, though you cannot trust his sales pitch, his prices are great.
As we forgive others their trespasses, others forgive us. Imag-
ine the chaos in a modern economy if employers insisted on seeking
damages against their workers every time they suffered losses from
negligence on the job. If you err on the computer and your com-
pany's mainframe shuts down for an afternoon, the company is very
unlikely to come after you with a claim for business interruption and
lost sales, as it might if you were a stranger whose negligence had
done the same damage. The shallowness of your pockets is only
one reason. Employers rationally recognize that they have a reputa-
tion for good will to protect among their employees and that by for-
swearing their right to recover damages, they are much more likely
to attract and keep workers and get their full cooperation on the job.
So they are understood to promise to overlook most negligent be-
havior-or at least to penalize such behavior with no sanction har-
sher than dismissal.
So it is with all of us: every day of our lives we pre-forgive
someone else's injurious, destructive, or even malicious behavior,
6 See Michael Siconolfi, Accountability Is the New Duty of Discounters, Big Board Says,
WALL ST.J.,JUly 19, 1991, at C1.
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the better to reassure them that they will not be too sorry for having
dealt with us. We give free passes to klutzes and hype artists, reneg-
ers and downright SOBs, agreeing not to push our legal rights
against them to a maximum, because we would rather not forego
dealing with them at all. And having made our bed, we are willing
to lie in it, although others get more than their precise share of the
blanket. None of this seems strange except to the modern legal
mind.7
We are frequently warned of the danger of assuming that peo-
ple can knowingly take care of themselves and assume risks. That
view, we are told, is "atomistic," or suited only to a simpler society,
or assumes omniscience on the part of an unwary consumer. In re-
ality, it is urged, most people do not really feel at liberty in their
dealings in the market place. They will say that there was no real
alternative to applying for a mortgage on such and such terms, or
that they were forced to stay at a particularjob because no other was
anywhere near as suitable, or that they signed a separation agree-
ment under duress because the alternatives at the time of the mari-
tal split were just too unpleasant.
Of course there is an element of truth in these characterizations
sufficient to provide fuel for discussion. Markets are not perfectly
competitive, finding alternatives can be prohibitively bothersome,
and emergency situations force people into quick decisions.
But if there is a dot of yin in the yang, a bit of helpless victimiza-
tion even in the most seemingly voluntary dealings by the sturdiest
citizens, so there is also a dot of yang in the yin. Even in the stran-
ger cases, where tort law has always had its greatest intuitive
strength, there is commonly a trace at least of consent, agreement,
and voluntariness. It is recognized in such traditional doctrines as
comparative negligence and especially assumption of risk. In as-
sumption of risk cases there may not be an explicit verbal contract,
but there is often a kind of nonverbal signaling. Compare, for ex-
ample, the Chicago Cubs case with the familiar case where a local
stranger stops by to watch an amateur softball game, because it is
fun to watch softball games, and is beaned by a foul ball. There is
no explicit contract there, no ticket stub like that given out by the
Cubs to those who pass through their gate. And yet it is not too
7 For one of many examples of the anti-disclaimer view, see WILLIAM M. LANDES&
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 282 (1987) ("[I]f we ob-
serve a clause disclaiming negligence, the presumption is that the consumer has been
deceived .. " (explaining why product liability disclaimers are not enforced in today's
courts)). Landes and Posner hypothesize that any conduct diagnosed by a court as neg-
ligence ipsofacto flunks a cost-benefit test. They then argue that rational buyers would
not voluntarily excuse less-than-cost-beneficial behavior in a seller when the happy alter-
native is to require it as part of the contract and divide the resulting gains.
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hard to see that the spectator moved to the risk and can be said to
have voluntarily, if not verbally, evinced a willingness to live with
that risk.
Part of our task, then, I would argue, is not only to roll back the
intrusion of tort law principles into contractual arrangements, but
also to re-import into tort law the contract-like principles that we
have kicked out of it. Without some element of consent and mutual-
ity, after all, resorting to law is a simple struggle of all against all, a
pure instrument of force and recrimination (albeit perhaps justified)
in which people raid each others' stores and demand each others'
chastisement.
We read in one book after another that assumption of risk is a
dying doctrine, a remnant of the bad old legal regime. Do not be-
lieve it. Assumption of risk lives on in the common sense of millions
of Americans who go into the back country for a hike, or enter the
hospital for an operation, or take out a mortgage, with confident
willingness to face a full measure of resulting risk. In speaking to
audiences about the litigation explosion, no question comes up as
often as this one: people ask, "Whatever happened to personal re-
sponsibility?" Why don't people recognize that sometimes they
make a bad bargain, or made a bad gamble, and just live with the
result? Why do they try to get money by blaming someone else?
The cases that annoy people most are the ones where people
are most blatantly trying to evade responsibility. The drunk who fell
on the subway tracks in New York and was awarded $9.3 million.8
The would-be suicide who jumped deliberately and was awarded
$600,000 million, her case being less sympathetic.9 The lawsuits
brought by-as opposed to against-drunk drivers.' 0 The case
where a woman read a recipe in Woman's Day which began, "put a
can of soup in the crock pot," and did not realize that she should
open and empty the can of soup.'1 Apparently she got money; the
publishers settled the case.
For some time assumption of risk has been unfashionable
among legal theorists. But it has never lost its life among the gen-
eral public. It is the proper legal reflection of the sense of individual
responsibility that has made, still makes, and should continue to
make America a great and free country.
8 See Calvin Sims, $9 Million Won For Loss of Arm In Drunken Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
21, 1990, at B3. See also Ellison v. New York City Transit Authority, 470 N.Y.S.2d 144
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
9 Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159 (NJ. 1988).
10 Arizona Isn't Immune, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1990.
11 Larry Bodine, New Dangers in the LegalJungle, MAGAZINE WEEK, Sept. 17, 1990, at
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